Polysemy and philosophy of language

Löhr, G.  (2025). Une vision minimaliste de la polysémie: Le minimalisme comme contrainte dans les négociations Métalinguistiques, Klesis, Special Issue on Francois Recanati

Michel, C. & Löhr, G. (2024). A cognitive psychological model of linguistic intuitions: Polysemy and order effects in copredication sentences. Lingua.

Michel C. & Löhr, G. (2023). Copredication and complexity revisited: Reply to Murphy's reply. Cognitive Science. 

Marsili, N. & Löhr, G. (2022). Saying, commitment and the lying-misleading distinction. The Journal of Philosophy.

Löhr, G. & Michel, C. (2022). Copredication in Context: A Predictive Processing Approach. Cognitive Science.

See reply to us by Elliot Murphy: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cogs.13207 

Löhr, G. & Michel, C. (2022). Predictive processing and the semiological principle. Invited (but peer-reviewed). Manuscrito. 

Löhr, G. (2021). Does polysemy support radical contextualism? On the relation between minimalism, contextualism and polysemy. Inquiry. 

Conceptual engineering/metaphilosophy

Löhr, G. & Veluwenkamp H. (forthcoming). Rethinking Philosophical Methodology: Conceptual Engineering Meets Value Sensitive Design. Metaphilosophy. Special Issue on Conceptual Engineering. Invited but peer reviewed. 

Hopster, J. & Löhr, G. (2023). Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation? Philosophy & Technology.

Koch, S., Löhr, G., Pinder M. (2023). Recent Work in the Theory of Conceptual Engineering. Analysis. 

Löhr G., & Michel, C. (2023). Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem. Mind and Language. 

Jorem S., & Löhr G., (2024). Inferentialist Conceptual Engineering. Special Issue: Pragmatism and Conceptual Engineering. Inquiry. 

Löhr, G. (2021). Commitment engineering: Conceptual engineering without representations. Synthese, 

Löhr, G. (2024). What’s the relation between conceptual ethics and ethics? An instrumentalist defense of conceptual engineering. In P. Stalmaszczyk, P. (ed.). Conceptual Engineering: Methodological and Metaphilosophical Issues. Brill/Mentis.

Löhr, G. (2019). The experience machine and the expertise defense. Philosophical Psychology.

Conceptual disruption and technology

Veluwenkamp, H., Hopster, J., Köhler, S., Löhr, G. (2024). Socially Disruptive Technologies and Conceptual Engineering. Ethics and InformationTechnology.

Hopster, J.; Gerola, A.; Hofbauer, B.; Korenhof, P.; Löhr, G. ; Rijssenbeek, J. (2023). Who owns ‘Nature’? Conceptual Appropriation in Discourses on Climate- and Biotechnologies. Environmental Values.

Löhr, G. (2023). Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework. Technology in Society. 

Löhr, G. (2023). Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions? Technology in Society. 

Löhr, G. (2022). Linguistic interventions and the ethics of conceptual disruption. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 

Marchiori, S., et al. Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology. In: van de Poel, Ibo, et al. (eds.). Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Open Book Publishers. 

The psychology of abstract concepts

Löhr, G., (2023). Does the mind care about whether a word is abstract or concrete? Why concreteness is probably not a natural kind. Mind and Language.

Löhr, G. (2021). What are abstract concepts? On lexical ambiguity and concreteness ratings. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.

Löhr, G. (2019). Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave anything out? Philosophical Psychology.

Löhr, G. (2017). Abstract concepts, compositionality, and the contextualism-invariantism debate. Philosophical Psychology.

Löhr, G. (2023). Are Concepts a Natural Kind? Against Concept Eliminativism. Philosophy and Mind Sciences. 

Löhr, G. (2020). Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things? Synthese.

Löhr, G. (2021). Social constructionism, concept acquisition and the mismatch problem. Synthese.

AI and robots

Löhr, G. (Forthcoming). Why Proxy Accounts of AI Speech Acts Fail. American Philosophical Quarterly.

Müller, V. & Löhr, G. (under contract). Artificial Minds. Cambridge University Press. (Elements)

Löhr, G. (forthcoming). Chatbots and Speech Act Responsibility Gaps. Communicating with AI: Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Rachel Sterken and Herman Cappelen. OUP.

Löhr, G. & Dennis, M. (2025). Prudential reasons for designing entitled chatbots: How robot "rights" can improve human well-being". AI and Ethics. 

Löhr, G., (2023). Robots can and will have interpersonal rights if they can refuse to cooperate with us. Robonomics (Special Issue on robot rights edited by David Gunkel). 

Löhr, G. (2023). If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly? AI & Ethics.

Löhr, G. (2022). Robot rights in joint action. In: Müller, V. (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2021.

Dale, M. et al. (2023). Social Robots and Society. In: van de Poel, Ibo, et al. (eds.). Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Open Book Publishers.

Joint Action and Directed Duties 

Löhr, G. (2024). What does it mean for a duty to be directed in a joint action?. Synthese.

Löhr, G. (2024). Two Kinds of Failure in a Joint Action: On Disrespect and Directed Duties. Analysis. 

Löhr, G., (2022). Recent experimental philosophy on joint action: Do we need a new normativism about collective action? Philosophical Quarterly, 

See reply by Gomez–Lavin & Rachar: https://academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pq/pqad047/7128315?login=false